CATHARSIS
A DEFINITION AND ITS EXPERIENCE
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Theater
Brooklyn College
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
By
Fulya Peker
Spring 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1
Part I: DEFINING CATHARSIS
- WHAT IS THE GOAL OF TRAGEDY? ...............................................................2
Aristotle’s Poetics
- WHAT IS THE GOAL OF CATHARSIS?.............................................................7
Interpretations of Aristotle’s Poetics
Catharsis as Purification
Catharsis as Purgation
Catharsis as Clarification
- WHAT IS CATHARSIS?.......................................................................................13
Towards a Working Definition of Catharsis
Transformation and Pleasure
Conclusion
Part II: EXPERIENCING CATHARSIS
- HOW CATHARSIS IS ACHIEVED BY THEATER…………………………....17
Catharsis in Oedipus Rex
Catharsis in Akropolis
- CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...29
BIBLIOGRAPHY…..………………………………………………………………...31
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
How do we respond to changes in life? What is our role in these changes? How do we recognize our responsibility as observers and participants of painful changes? Do we fear the truths hidden in ourselves? How can we confront the painful truths? Is it possible to respond such pain with pleasure?
Theater is a way to explore such questions. Effective theater can satisfy our conflicted desire to know more about truths that are painful. One of the ongoing controversies about theater is what is its ultimate goal? In order to address this question, one source that has often been referred to is the Poetics, written by Aristotle in the 4th century B.C. In the discussions about theater within the context of the Poetics, one concept that stands out in particular is catharsis, which has created its own myriad controversies. From Ancient Greeks to our time, the meaning and function of catharsis has been interpreted by psychologists, philologists, philosophers, theater artists and scholars under three main categories: purification; purgation; clarification. However, a common agreement on the meaning or function of catharsis is yet to emerge.
Inspired by a similar ‘desire to know more’ that has moved mankind for centuries, I will dig deeper into these controversies, examine the existing debates, and try to create my own working definition of catharsis. I will then put my working definition to the test by using it to analyze the cathartic elements in Oedipus Rex by Sophocles and Grotowski’s Akropolis. This will also allow me to explore parallels between the functioning of catharsis in Ancient Greece and its possible functioning today.
Part I: DEFINING CATHARSIS
CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS THE GOAL OF TRAGEDY?
Aristotle’s Poetics
Tragedy is, then, an imitation of a noble and complete action, having the proper magnitude; it employs language that has been artistically enhanced by each of the kinds of linguistic adornment, applied separately in the various parts of the play; it is presented in dramatic, not narrative form, and achieves, through the representation of pitiful and fearful incidents, the catharsis of such pitiful and fearful incidents (Golden 1981, 11). [Italics added]
In the sixth chapter of the Poetics, Aristotle gives the definition of tragedy. In the last part of his definition he uses the word catharsis without explaining what it means. So the meaning of catharsis is a subject of discussion. If it is a goal to be achieved in tragedy, looking at what the Poetics suggests as the achievement of tragedy can help us understand what catharsis might mean.
In the first chapter, Aristotle emphasizes that all kinds of poetry are modes of mimesis or imitation. He expands his vision in the second chapter, and focuses on the objects of imitation, that is, men in action. He then emphasizes in his fourth chapter that poetry in general has sprung from two causes, each of them lying deep in our nature: “First, the instinct of imitation. . . . Next, there is the instinct for harmony” (Aristotle 1961, 55-56). He then focuses on pleasure that comes with imitation. Imitation is pleasurable. “The reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring . . .” (ibid, 55). It is very important then to keep in mind that imitation is the fundamental cause of poetry, which is pleasurable. Through this imitation we feel pleasure, because we can learn more about what is unknown. Tragedy is a form of poetry, so it is a mode of imitation as well. To satisfy the instinct for imitation is the first goal to be achieved by tragedy.
What does tragedy imitate to satisfy the instinct for imitation? In the sixth chapter, Aristotle emphasizes that “tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality” (ibid, 62). It is important that tragedy imitates man in action. When we focus on the word “action” we see the importance of seeing man in progression, in change. Everything in nature is in the act of change and this idea is not a strange one for Greeks, who have tried to understand this change. The creation of myths is a way of dealing with change. The Greeks celebrated or lamented changes in nature, by rule of the gods, through their festivals and rituals. Through imitation, the Greeks tried to create a likeness in order to learn more about the action imitated. At this point, a quote from Aristotle’s Metaphysics can help: “Like can be grasped only by like” (Bachofen 1973, 16). When men try to grasp this change in nature, they try to imitate it, and through this imitation they learn about it, at least they get a sense of it. That is why it is important to emphasize that action imitated by tragedy is not just the imitation of the doing, but that of a process in which one experiences change through the acts one does. The imitation of change, of the man in action, is the second goal to be achieved by tragedy.
How does tragedy imitate change? First of all the change that happens in tragedy is a change that has “a proper magnitude,” it is “serious,” it is a “pitiful and fearful” change from good to bad (Aristotle 1961, 76). Tragedy imitates this serious change by two “powerful elements of emotional interest. . . . Peripetia or the Reversal of Situation, and [Anagnorisis or] Recognition scenes. . .” (ibid, 63). However, there is a third important element that we should consider first in order to understand the importance of these scenes: the idea of universality. Aristotle mentions it in the ninth chapter of the Poetics. “It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity” (ibid, 68). Through this understanding he emphasizes the universality of tragedy. “Poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity” (ibid, 68). In this context, Aristotle is not using the word possibility but probability. He does not only suggest that tragedy represents the things that may happen, but the likelihood of a given event occurring. The change that is represented can be experienced by everyone. So tragedy should create likelihood, and through this likelihood we should experience identification with the hero. Then we need a hero like ourselves, “who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty” (ibid, 76). Only then can we explore the probability of the change and see the likelihood of it, only then can we grasp the universality of the change that is represented by tragedy. Change once again is important here, because change has a probability of reoccurring even though the incidents that motivate the change differ in each play. Probability and likelihood lead us to universality. Tragedy tends to represent the universality of a serious change and this is the third goal to be achieved by tragedy.
Returning to the scenes of reversal of situation and recognition, there is an important point in chapter nine that should be emphasized, that the effect of tragedy can best be produced when there is a surprise, and it can be further increased when this surprise is accompanied by cause and effect (ibid, 70). “Reversal of the situation is a change by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to rule of probability or necessity” (ibid, 72). When this change happens there is surprise. Recognition on the other hand also “is a change from ignorance to knowledge” (ibid, 72). Recognition is the climax of the learning process for the hero, which is both pleasurable and painful. It is not easy to handle this recognition of probability of change. When we, the audience, witness it, we are not only surprised, but we feel pity for the man who can not do anything against this change, which can be called misfortune. We also feel fear by experiencing the universality of the change, as it can also happen to us. “Pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves” (ibid, 76).
When we recognize the universality of the change in nature from good to bad that victimizes a man, we feel pity and fear. These emotions are the ones tragedy represents and awakens in us, which are connected to each other: We fear because we pity and we pity because we fear. To be affected by these emotions we need to feel sympathy and familiarity for the character. Only then, through this likeness and resemblance, can we satisfy the moral sense and call forth pity and fear (ibid, 75). This arousal of pity and fear as a result of reversal and recognition is the fourth goal to be achieved by tragedy.
As mentioned above, imitation in itself is already a pleasurable act, because through imitation we can experience likeness, contemplate it, and learn more about it. The act of knowing is pleasurable. Imitation of an unexpected change also arouses pity and fear, which are painful emotions. However, tragedy, while representing man in a painful change, gives us a pleasure that is proper to it. Through painful recognition we feel pleasure. Although we identify with the hero, and participate in the emotional arousal within tragedy, we are still the observers of something that might happen. We experience an intense participation at the same time as an implicit detachment because of the aesthetic distance (Scheff 1979, 60-61). This arousal of emotions leads us to a learning process. Knowing appeases us by helping us deal with change and its probability. We grasp universality through the suffering of the common man because of a change. This feeling of knowing gives us pleasure which is the fifth goal to be achieved by tragedy.
To sum up, there are five goals to be achieved by tragedy:
· Satisfaction of the instinct of imitation
· Imitation of change (action)
· Imitation of universality (likelihood-probability)
· Arousal of pity and fear (through reversal and recognition)
· Pleasure of knowing and dealing with painful truth
Hence, imitation of a serious change arouses pity and fear, and subsequently pleasure. The first pair of feelings is stimulated through universality, reversal of situation and recognition. Pleasure is created by recognizing and handling the painful truth. When this kind of imitation is achieved in tragedy, catharsis can also be achieved. Then catharsis is the experience of a process that involves imitation of a change, recognition of universal truth, arousal of pity and fear, and pleasure of knowing.
CHAPTER 3
WHAT IS THE GOAL OF CATHARSIS?
Interpretations of Aristotle’s Poetics
As stated earlier, in the Poetics, Aristotle does not give a clear definition of catharsis. Hence, the meaning and goal of catharsis has engendered many debates. In these discussions, the three most common translations of catharsis—derived from the word katharei which means clean or clear—are purification (cleansing), purgation (clearance), and clarification (clarifying). It is now necessary to look at these various interpretations of catharsis and explore the differences and similarities among them.
Catharsis as Purification
Catharsis as purification is a transformation process. Pity and fear are aroused by tragedy to transform the extremes of emotions into virtuous habits. The goal of catharsis as purification of pity and fear is to create a moral discipline in the audience’s reaction to such emotions. The idea of purification dates back to the ancient religious lustration, the expiation of guilt by priestly ceremonies. When we look at the background of ancient Greek tragedy it is not hard to see the religious-moral connotations: “During the Dionysiac festivals, and as part of the worship by the polis of the god of Bacchic enthusiasm, fertility and wine, the Athenian would attend the performance of a tragedy” (Entralgo 1970, 229). Many historical accounts show that in the Athens of Aristotle, theater was still connected to the idea of worship. Misfortunes of man can be understood as resulting from impurity, guilt or pollution, which engender the anger of the gods. The possibility of misfortune is very effective for arousing the emotions of pity and fear. In ancient Greece, through rituals, festivals and sacrifices, man purified himself of the extremes of pity and fear by the very excitation of such emotions.
Lessing interprets catharsis as such a purification process in his Hamburg Dramaturgy. To understand what it is that is being purified through tragedy, he first explores the relation between pity and fear and how they are aroused. For Lessing, only if we fear for ourselves can we feel pity for another person. Pity involves fear, but this does not mean that fear is just an ingredient of pity. “It is the fear which arises for ourselves from the similarity of our position with that of the sufferer; it is the fear that the calamities impending over the sufferer might also befall ourselves; it is the fear that we ourselves might thus become objects of pity. In a word this fear is compassion referred back to ourselves” (Lessing 1962, 179). Pity and fear are then both the causes and effects of one another. “[Aristotle] believed that events capable of awakening our compassion, must at the same time awaken our fear, or rather, by means of this fear, they awaken compassion” (ibid, 183). This awakening about pity and fear is a moral necessity for humanity because they create a connection between “ourselves” and “others.” However, the extremes of them can cause problems for the society. Such extremes can be dangerous as Plato indicates in the third book of the Republic, because they reduce the courage that is necessary for being a good citizen (Murray 2004, 24). Lessing offers purification of such extremes as a solution to such danger. “Purification rests in nothing else than in the transformation of passions into virtuous habits, and since according to our philosopher [Aristotle] each virtue has two extremes between which it rests, it follows that if tragedy is to change our pity into virtue, it must also be able to purify us from the two extremes of pity, and the same is to be understood of fear” (Lessing 1962, 193).
To purify something, there is supposed to be an impurity in it. In religious rites of purification the soul is cleansed from some sin or pollution. In tragedy, pity and fear are cleansed of their own “extremes.” These extremes are the causes of misfortunes and sufferings. Tragedy moderates and reduces them to a just measure, because the excitement of these emotions in theater weakens their force. This process helps us not to fear and pity too much or too little, but in moderation. These feelings are not removed, but their extremes are transformed into virtue. So, for Lessing, catharsis as purification means moderation and transformation of passions for creating a social order.
Catharsis as Purgation
Catharsis as purgation is a healing process. Pity and fear are aroused by tragedy to remove the mental disturbance caused by such emotions. Purgation achieved by tragedy is similar to the treatment of an illness in the body. This idea of catharsis as healing dates back to Hippocrates, and his homeopathic theory. In this theory “catharsis is the result of a process employed to drive out the detrimental elements in the body or the mind by exposing it to an excess of the harmful element” (Abdulla 1985, 16). In his 1559 work De Poeta, Minturno argues that “the principles of the homeopathic theory of medicine which require for the elimination of a disease the application of a therapeutic agent similar in nature to that disease are also applicable to mental afflictions” (Golden 1973a, 473). In his 1563 Arte Poetica, Minturno emphasizes that the purgation achieved by tragedy is similar to the medical treatment of illness in the body. This treatment of distress then becomes the subject of psychology. In the early twentieth century, Freud uses the term catharsis in his psychoanalysis as a process in which a person, by identifying the past distressful emotions, can experience an emotional arousal and through this discharge of emotions, one can overcome such emotions, in other words be healed (Abdulla 1985, 8).
One important exploration of the idea of catharsis as purgation can be found in Bernays’s article, On Catharsis. Bernays starts with a critique of Lessing. “After Lessing has gone through all the stages of too much and too little pity and fear, one might call tragedy a moral house of correction that must keep in readiness the remedial method conductive for every irregular turning of pity and fear” (Bernays 2004, 321). In order to develop his own definition of catharsis, Bernays begins by emphasizing the importance of understanding the word catharsis as a technical term of aesthetics. Once this aspect is forgotten, the meaning of catharsis is understood as the separation of what is impure from what is pure, a process of cleansing. However, this is not the case for Bernays. Instead of the Poetics, Bernays begins his interpretation with another text written by Aristotle, the Politics. In the eighth book of the Politics, Aristotle makes a classification of musical harmonies: moral mood (ethical), agitated mood leading to a deed (practical), and enthusiastic mood. He also offers several purposes of music: instruction, catharsis and amusement. According to Aristotle, enthusiastic harmonies create an effect similar to that of tragedy. Through the intoxication of the mind, they calm the hearer and cause a pleasurable removal of distressful emotions, as experienced through a medical cure and catharsis. This pleasure is a harmless, innocent one. This is interpreted as Aristotle’s answer to Plato’s indictment about tragedy in the tenth book of the Republic where Plato claims that tragedy weakens the self-control of emotions (Bywater 1909, 153).
Bernays uses Aristotle’s arguments about the effect of music on society in developing his interpretation of catharsis as a healing process. Through this exploration of the Politics, Bernays defines catharsis as such: “Catharsis is: a designation transferred from somatic to mental for the type of treatment given to an oppressed person that does not seek to transform or suppress the element oppressing him, but rather to arouse and drive it into the open, and thereby to bring about the relief of the oppressed person” (Bernays 2004, 329).
To reach a healthy state of mind, one needs to discharge the imbalanced emotions. In this approach, the emphasis is on removing the emotions such as pity and fear, instead of transforming them. This is a process of clearance, instead of cleansing. According to the purgation theory of catharsis, the emotions that can cause disturbance and weaken self-control can be removed by tragedy, through the arousal and discharge of such emotions, to heal the distressed individuals.
Catharsis as Clarification
Catharsis as clarification is a process of cognition and learning. Tragedy arouses pity and fear to clarify our minds about such emotions. We recognize the universal, common truths about mankind through the suffering of the tragic hero. Leon Golden criticizes Bernays’s analogies between the Poetics and the Politics by pointing to Aristotle’s argument in the first chapter of the Poetics that he will analyze poetry in itself. According to Golden, the meaning of catharsis cannot be alike in the Politics and in the Poetics, because “the one is a political utterance and the other aesthetic utterance” (Golden 1973b, 474). Through following this argument and exploring the meaning of catharsis by looking at the Poetics, the idea of inferring and learning in tragedy gains a greater importance. “The process of inference described by Aristotle ‘clarifies’ the nature of the individual act by providing, through the medium of art, the means of ascending from the particular event witnessed to an understanding of its universal nature, and thus it permits us to understand the individual act more clearly and distinctly” (Golden 1962, 57). Catharsis in this approach is not physical, psychological or ethical cleansing or clearance, but “clarifying” in the intellectual sense (ibid, 56). Golden translates the word as “making clear” or “intellectual clarification.”
The appearance of catharsis in Plato’s Phadeo provides a further example of the usage of the term in this sense: “Catharsis, here [Phadeo], is clearly a purification process by which the soul is freed of the admixture of the body and thus becomes able to contemplate clearly” (ibid, 56). In Phadeo, catharsis is used as a separation of soul from the body which is the lifelong goal of philosophers and can only be achieved at death. Golden indicates that poetry is considered as being philosophical “because it aims the expression of universals rather than particulars” (Golden1973a, 45). Philosophy is a process of contemplating the deeper, common truths about humanity. The idea of contemplation opens up the discussion of imitation, which is the key point to understanding the goal of tragedy and through that, the meaning of catharsis. Imitation is a “learning process,” hence it involves contemplation. Imitation of particular pitiful and fearful incidents, leads us to recognition of universal causes of such incidents. Clarifying our minds about the causes of pitiful and fearful incidents and learning the nature of such emotions lead us to pleasure. “The goal of tragedy must be an intellectually pleasant learning experience concerned with the phenomenon of pity and fear in human existence” (ibid, 45), because the “proper pleasure” of tragedy is derived from pity and fear. Golden concludes that for Aristotle catharsis is “an intellectual climax to the artistic process” (ibid, 46).
CHAPTER 4
WHAT IS CATHARSIS?
Towards a Working Definition of Catharsis
In Aristotle’s Poetics, catharsis––which should involve the imitation of a change leading to a recognition of the universal truth, the arousal of pity and fear and the pleasure of knowing––is explored as a goal to be achieved by tragedy. In the interpretations of the Poetics, the focus is on the goal of catharsis: purification, purgation, or clarification. In purification, pity and fear are transformed into virtues by eliminating the extremes of such emotions. In purgation, transformation is achieved by reaching a calm and balanced state of mind through discharging such emotions. In clarification, ignorance is transformed into knowledge through the recognition and understanding of such emotions. In all three cases, there is a transformation that has a pleasurable outcome. The next step is to focus on two important concepts that recur in both Aristotle’s writings and its interpretations: transformation and pleasure.
Transformation and Pleasure
In tragedy, transformation first appears in the notion of imitation. In the process of artistic imitation, the artist focuses on the universal meaning in a particular event, eliminates unnecessary details, and removes what causes confusion. The artist tries to prove that it is possible to know and understand how the inevitable change takes place. “Mimesis means that the method or process of art imitates the method or process of nature” (Goldstein 1966, 570). Imitation shapes the raw material, and creates its own material. This act of creation is similar to that of creation in nature. We are amazed when we see the power of man creating the way nature creates. Imitation is a satisfaction, hence it is pleasurable.
Through imitation we can get closer to what is beyond our everyday perceptions, what is real. “Mimesis clears away everything but what is meaningful, and because all is now meaningful it can without revulsion enter our minds and bear fruit” (Kitto 1966, 144). The Poetics leads us to the conclusion that imitation causes an inferring and learning process. This learning process is also a transformation of ignorance into knowledge, which recalls the idea of recognition in tragedy. Recognition transforms distressful confusion into resolution and clarification. Through recognition, the painful confusion that causes pity and fear is transformed and resolved into the universal, clearer and more distinct experience of pity and fear. “Thanks to anagnorisis the spectator knows and recognizes what really is occurring on stage and therefore is his possible fate. . . . The original confusion of life is transformed into order. . . . The anagnorisis represents, in short, the triumph of that deep demand for expression and clarification of the human destiny” (Entralgo 1970, 230). Through imitation the artist expresses his/her insight, and recognition is the moment when we share the artist’s vision.
How do we share such vision? We identify with the tragic hero, who is like us. We fear the particular truth that awaits him. After he recognizes the painful truth and starts to suffer, we feel pity for his suffering. As we observe the particular, an experience of recognition takes place. We fear the universal common condition as we recognize the probability of our own lives becoming such objects of pity. Through this encounter with the truth we feel the extremes of pity and fear and experience the discharge of such emotions. When this discharge occurs, we transcend such emotions; a balanced state of mind is achieved; the passions in us are transformed into calmness and virtue; pity and fear are transformed into a moderate level. As a result of such transformation we contemplate the truth. “Mimesis refines the raw material, distressful in itself, by making it a universal which we can contemplate with pleasure- the pleasure of understanding things better” (Kitto 1966, 145).
Witnessing the imitation and experiencing recognition leads us to contemplation, which gives us an instinctive pleasure because through such contemplation the universal meaning of change is clarified. Is not this encounter with clarification the desire of mankind? “The catharsis of tragedy, then results in a clarification both of emotion and of thought, for emotion becomes objective in a work of art, and the mind is elevated so that it contemplates its own emotion and thus achieves imaginative freedom” (Brunius 1966, 78).
How do we respond to such an encounter? “Tragic pleasure must be the outcome of catharsis which is affected through pity and fear” (Schaper 1968, 138). Tragic pleasure is not purely emotional or purely intellectual but both, which is an “aesthetic response.” This aesthetic response can only be created from an “aesthetic distance” in which one can experience intense participation and yet detachment at the same time. “At aesthetic distance there is a balance of thought and feeling. There is a deep emotional resonance, but also a feeling of control” (Scheff 1979, 64). We do not respond to the distressful truth the way we do in our daily lives while we experience its painful effect. Our responses to pity and fear give us pleasure–– the pleasure of handling pain better.
Conclusion
In the course of tragedy, distressful emotions are not removed but transformed into aesthetic emotions; pity and fear are transformed into meaningful and intelligible events. Norman de Witt indicates that catharsis comes from the word katharia, which means “pruning vines.” Catharsis is similar to the process of “pruning vines,” which is “both a taking-away and a shaping, a way of making material usable” (Goldstein 1966, 575). Like the vines transformed into wine, the painful raw material in nature is transformed into an artistic one that leads us to understand and handle the painful truth better. Emotional confusion is transformed into wisdom.
“Tragedy can move us to the limits of our capacities; it can give us the recognition of humanity at its best” (Schaper 1968, 140-141). This explains the importance of wisdom emphasized at the end of Greek tragedies. “Wisdom is far the chief element in happiness and, secondly no irreverence towards the gods” (Sophocles 1991, 212). The pleasure of wisdom, the great insight, however, comes with pain: “Perfect vision is agony” (Aeschylus 1999, 59).
In conclusion then: catharsis is a pleasurable (and painful) transformation of pity and fear into wisdom.
Part II: EXPERIENCING CATHARSIS
CHAPTER 5
HOW CATHARSIS IS ACHIEVED BY THEATER
Catharsis in Oedipus Rex
The plague first began to show itself among the Athenians . . . there was no ostensible cause. . . . Some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. . . . there was the awful spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection in nursing each other . . . The bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the fountains in their longing for water. . . . Fear of Gods or law of men there was none to restrain them (Thucydides 2004, 88-99).
Such a plague leaves man alone with his pain, without the gods or any kind of reason. It creates a confrontation with our deepest selves and the collective loneliness of mankind. Right after the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in 431 B.C, a plague emerged in Athens between 429 and 425 B.C. The plague suddenly destroyed the existing confidence in human reason. The golden years of the reign of Pericles turned into misery. Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex was performed around 426 B.C, perhaps as a direct response to this catastrophe. Almost seventy-six years later, Aristotle considered it as one of the most successful plays in his Poetics in 350 B.C. How then does Oedipus Rex inspire catharsis?
There was an emphasis on the power of reason against the power of the gods in Sophocles’ time, a period which is called the Fifth Century Enlightenment by the scholars. “This period is marked by a shift from the mythical and symbolic thinking, characteristic of archaic poets ––like Homer, Hesiod, Pindar––to the more conceptual and abstract modes of thought, according to which the world operated through personal processes that followed predictable scientific laws” (Segal 1993, 6). The archaic worldview explains the painful incidents taking place beyond men’s own will or control as due to the power of the gods, but also through a kind of scientific approach. All beings in nature are in a responsive relationship to one another. “Imbalance and violation in one area will produce some kind of disturbance in another” (ibid, 8). The plague leads to other plagues. This is called “curse” by the archaic worldview; however, it is about the imbalance in nature. Everything is in a state of change and everything in this change is affected by one another. “From Homer to Aristotle both poets and philosophers tended to ask not ‘was he free?’ as we might do, but ‘is he responsible?’ (Bloom 1988, 52). We are responsible for our lives and we are fallible creatures. Through this recognition man understands his power to shape his own life. However, this recognition comes with pain and suffering because there are still some residues of the archaic worldview about mysterious forces that resists the power of human reason. It is not yet easy to encounter such fallibilities and responsibilities without hiding behind the idea of the gods.
Sophocles, in his play, represents such a clash between the unknown powers of the archaic worldview and man’s own responsibility through examining incidents that shape his own life. He takes the raw material, the plague in Athens, and re-shapes it through imitation; he clears the fuzziness and represents a particular story that haunts the tragic hero, Oedipus. Sophocles does not question whether man is autonomous or whether he is a puppet in the hands of the gods. He explores the responsibility of man over his own life, which will reach a specific end. This end is known by the gods, but not directed by them. Oedipus is free to decide the road he wants to walk on. This understanding is different for the Greeks than the modern notion of fate. They know their end, but this does not make them pessimistic; they fight to change it. They have the power to handle such responsibility, although it comes with pain.
This contradiction between man’s own fallibility and his victimization by unknown forces is what motivates man’s desire to know, the desire to have an active role in the changes in nature that surround him. Imitation of this universal truth in the particular story of Oedipus gives us pleasure, and transforms us from ignorance to knowledge, from blindness to insightfulness. Without being infected by the plague, we sense the probability of it, which arouses pity and fear in us. Without having to blind ourselves as Oedipus does, we reach an insight about our own fallibility.
The play begins in front of the palace of Oedipus at Thebes. Thebans beg Oedipus for help against the plague that brings great harm and suffering to their land under his rule. Oracles offer a solution: to find the murderer of the King Laius, who was the King of Thebes before the throne was given to Oedipus who saved the land from the Sphinx. Oedipus has the desire to know the truth, but he is also blind to his own fallibility, the plague in himself. Through some painful investigations, it turns out that he is the murderer of Laius; he is the husband of his own mother; and he is also the brother of his own children. When he recognizes this truth that evades human reason, he blinds himself and goes into exile. His sorrows are transformed into contemplation. Wisdom comes with pain. The plague reaches an end with a sacrifice, with the victimization of a man by his own self. Recognition brings pain but also a satisfaction of knowing the truth. We, the observers of such incidents, have a desire to know the truth, too. Hence, through this particular story we encounter our own fallibilities and the existence of a possible plague in all of us.
Such experience begins with identification with Oedipus, who is a man like us. He is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty. In the very beginning of the play we witness his nobility and sensitivity as a King. Some lines below show his goodness and help create identification through sympathy: “What do you fear and want, that you sit here suppliant? Indeed I am willing to give all that you may need; I would be very hard should I not pity suppliants like these” (Sophocles 1991, 11). His lines imply that he is one of us: “My spirit groans for city and myself and you at once” (ibid, 13). Also, “I became a citizen among you citizens” (ibid, 19). Although he is noble, we also witness his unjust behavior against Creon and Tiresias, who try to help him. He accuses them of a betrayal, of conspiring against him in order to get the throne. He represents the blindness of an overly passionate man who desires to discover the truth.
There is a process of discovery in the play to find the answer to the question of who murdered Laius; it can be anyone in Athens. It can even be the “noblest man” in Athens. However, to admit fallibility is not as easy. It is this fallibility that arouses pity and fear in us. At the beginning of the play, Oedipus does not see his own role in such painful incidents. This tension reaches its resolution in the recognition scene, when the real identity of Oedipus is revealed. Oedipus blinds himself, for he gains an insight by recognizing his responsibility in the painful incidents that surround him and Thebes. Oedipus is neither bad, nor innocent. He is “responsible.”
Identification with Oedipus ends at this point. We become observers of his suffering. We feel pity for Oedipus, because we fear for ourselves. Through experiencing the extremes of such emotions, a discharge occurs. With this experience we are transformed from being horrified into a balanced state of mind. We contemplate the greater, common truth which is our own fallibility, our own responsibility. Through this contemplation our minds are clarified about the plague within ourselves. The plague is inevitable; it is impossible not to be infected. We are all responsible for the plague that exists within us. We do not respond to such emotions the way we would in our daily lives. We are in an aesthetic distance, from where we can safely feel such emotions and observe such incidents. We experience those emotions without responding to or being hurt by them. Through handling such pain, an aesthetic response is achieved. Pity and fear are transformed into wisdom about such emotions. To be able to accept responsibility for our own fallibility becomes the wisdom itself. It is the wisdom we seek for, which is pleasurable.
Underlining some lines from the play will at this point help explain the goal of the play, and the effect that is expected to be created in the spectator, which is catharsis. The lines below are not directed to the spectator, they are lines taken out from conversations of various characters in the play. Let’s treat these lines as if they are directly said by Sophocles to his fellow Athenians:
· “All of you here know nothing” (ibid, 24).
The spectator knows nothing about the pain that awaits Oedipus.
· “News I bring will give you pleasure. Perhaps a little pain too” (ibid, 50).
Through recognition we will feel the pleasure of understanding things better, but also encounter the truth, which is painful in itself.
· “What deeds you will hear of and what horrors see, what grief you will fear. . .” (ibid, 65).
· “Soon you will see a sight to waken pity even in the horror of it” (ibid, 67).
In the course of the play our pity is awakened even though the things we witness horrify us. Because we fear for ourselves, we pity others.
· “Indeed I pity you, but I cannot look at you, though there is much I want to ask and much to learn and much to see. I shudder at the sight of you” (ibid, 67).
There are things to learn about the suffering that overtakes Oedipus, however, it is hard to face the truth.
· “Call no mortal happy till he has passed the final limit of his life secure from pain” (ibid, 76).
This pain is probable for all of us. There is always a possibility for all of us to experience such painful change.
· “We need no angry words but only thought” (ibid, 28).
We do not need the extremes but we need to contemplate the emotions that we experience.
· “For what you ask me, if you hear my words, and hearing welcome them and fight with the plague, you will find strength and lightening of your load” (ibid, 19).
If the spectator can hear the poet and share his vision, if one can accept and handle the truth one is faced with, one can feel enlightened.
· “It is sweet to keep our thoughts out of the range of hurt” (ibid, 70).
Although it is painful to experience pity and fear, it gives us pleasure to clarify our minds, without being hurt by such pitiful and fearful incidents. With this journey, sorrows can be transformed through contemplation into wisdom.
Catharsis in Akropolis
In 1962, Karl Adolf Eichman––who served as a self proclaimed Jewish Specialist and was the person responsible for keeping the trains rolling from all over Europe to the extermination camps as part of the Final Solution––was executed, after his trial in Jerusalem, for crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The same year, the international Auschwitz monument and museums were opened in Poland. Again, in the same year, Grotowski’s piece Akropolis premiered.
Grotowski uses the raw material of the extermination camps and the clash between hope and hopelessness; dreams and reality. Akropolis is based on Stanislaw Wyspianski’s play written in 1904. The text is modified in parts, and some changes and additions are made. The phrases in the original text “Our Akropolis” and “the cemetery of the tribes” are the source of the questions Grotowski asks with his piece: What is the cemetery of our civilization? Where is our Akropolis?
Akropolis is a Greek word. “Akro” means top or high and “polis” means the city. This word is used in ancient Greece for the upper parts of the cities. One of the most important “high points” of ancient Greece was the Akropolis in Athens where the most vital sacred and secular places were located. In Wyspianski’s Akropolis, on the night of the resurrection, the figures depicted on the royal tapestries come to life and enact episodes from the history of Poland. At the end, there is the resurrection of the Christ, the Savior who is also Apollo, the God of dreams. This resurrection is followed by a triumphant procession to liberate Europe. In his play, Wyspianski names the Royal Palace of Krakow as Akropolis, and dramatizes the past with a heroic approach. However, for Grotowski, Akropolis connotes “a ruined past.” In one of the interviews Grotowski says: “Since World War II we have noticed that the great lofty values of Western civilization remain abstract. We mouth heroic values, but real life proves to be different. We must confront the great values of the past and ask some questions” (Croyden 1997, 82). Wysianski’s Akropolis is similar to that of Pericles’s bright days; however, for Grotowski the Akropolis is similar to the one that was filled with corpses after the plague in Athens. To discover if the heroic values of the past really exist for us, Grotowski represents Akropolis as the extermination camp in Auschwitz, where the ruined past of Poland lies. He represents the clash between dreams of freedom and the inevitable end in Auschwitz.
In Grotowski’s treatment of the text, prisoners of the extermination camp––who are buried in Auschwitz in real life but brought back to life on stage––build a civilization of gas chambers with rusted metal props. They work like soldiers. During their breaks from work, prisoners indulge in daydreams. They take the names of biblical and Homeric heroes; they identify with them, and live a different life than their own. The struggle between Jacob and the Angel becomes a fight between two prisoners. They cannot escape from each other. This famous scene from the Old Testament is interpreted as that of two victims torturing each other in order to survive. An unfulfilled eroticism rules their world where privacy is impossible. Paris and Helen express the charm of sensuous love, but Helen is a man. Their love duet is accompanied by the sarcastic laughter of other prisoners. Jacob directs his expression of tenderness toward objects; his bride is a stovepipe wrapped in a piece of rag for a veil. His wedding procession is accompanied by a folksong sung by the other prisoners. Then follows the representation of the Jews in front of the wall of lamentation: four prisoners press their bodies against the walls of the theater like martyrs; they recite the prayer of hope in God’s help, pronounced by the Angel in Jacob’s dream. Cassandra, one of the prisoners, walks out of the ranks at roll call and announces what fate holds in store for the community. Confronted with the truth, the prisoners seek hope in the Savior. The Savior is a headless, bluish, badly mauled corpse. One of the prisoners lifts his hands with a lyrical gesture. The crowd follows him in a procession. They sing a Christmas hymn to honor the Savior. They cry “here is our Savior.” The singing becomes an ecstatic lament with screams and hysterical laughter. They fall into the box that is placed in front of the stage together with the corpse/savior. Silence. A voice is heard: “They are gone, and smoke rises in the spirals.” This tells us that they are buried in the crematorium of the extermination camp (Flaszen 1997, 64-68).
Such an experience of truth begins with identification with the prisoners of the extermination camp. Prisoners have to oppress each other to survive in an extermination camp, but they also share their dreams and hopes. They are not eminently just and good, but their misfortunes are not brought about by vice. In order for the prisoners to deal with their imminent death, they have dreams about freedom, which will not come true; it is a game they play to handle the pain that awaits them. Here the play tries to awaken a history, a history which is full of sufferings. Hope and heroism are destroyed; even the Savior falls into the crematorium. We witness their painful death. We are the ones left behind, the living beings. This particular destruction arouses pity in us because we fear for ourselves. We are awakened from our sleep. We encounter the painful truth about the dreams of the past, which are transformed into the sufferings of mankind. Sometimes the truths we confront are not easy to handle, but we cannot escape from them because we are part of that truth. Through this recognition we experience extremes of pity and fear that causes the discharge of such emotions. After we reach beyond the emotional arousal, into a balanced state of mind, we contemplate whether the dreams of the past are real or just abstractions that keep our dreams and hopes alive. We recognize that we need to take responsibility for past incidents that shape our lives. We decide the roads we want to walk on, although the end is known. Because it is not as easy to handle such pain, we choose to believe in dreams. We experience the transformation of Akropolis in us into Auschwitz. We share the fear that fills the air of an extermination camp, the fear of confronting such truths about our ruined past without hiding behind heroic dreams. Our minds are clarified about the grief hidden behind the heroic past. Our pity and fear is transformed into wisdom that comes from handling such truth.
Is such a transformation pleasurable? We pity and fear for the dead bodies of the extermination camp, the dead bodies of the plague, the blinded eyes of Oedipus. However, in an experience of such painful incidents, we still feel pleasure, the pleasure of seeing how raw material from our past can be represented in such a clear way, the pleasure of knowing and handling such truths that are horrifying. From the aesthetic distance that is created in theater, we go beyond our regular, daily responses to such incidents. Hence, pity and fear does not cause an escape or depression but a transformation of our worldviews. We share the vision of the artist through recognition.
There is no hero in Akropolis, like an Oedipus, but there is a community that we identify with. Grotowski integrates the audience and actors to increase the effectiveness of the play. Aesthetic distance requires a balance between being involved and detached at the same time. In modern times the audience can lack involvement, preferring to remain an observer. This impacts the possible emergence of catharsis in a negative way. We are so individualized now that in order to recognize common and universal truths, and share the original sufferings of mankind, we need to become a community in the course of the theatrical experience. Grotowski locates the spectators in the acting space. He gives them the role of “living beings” who are observing the struggles of prisoners in the extermination camp.
Plot is not very important for Grotowski, but it is the main thing for Aristotle. In our time we need living forces, a direct communication with mankind, without the props of technology. The goal is to reach what lies deep within us, what is hidden in our very selves. Hence, we need to see pure, naked man, without a mask. Theater was effective in ancient Greece because it had a ritualistic power. It was worship, a festivity. Now, it is just an entertainment. To add ritualistic aspects to theater is very important to awaken the sacred in us. Grotowski does this with the use of body and voice of the actors in a primal way. This awakens the live instinctive force that lies within us, which can lead us to identification with the community.
In both plays, we can say that there is “confrontation with myth, not identification” (Grotowski 1968, 23). Identification, however, happens between man and man, and opens up a universal, common truth that waits to be recognized. To be able to recognize something, we should be ready to confront it. How does this confrontation happen? In Akropolis, the painful end is masked with dreams of freedom. This gives men a chance to handle the truth. In Oedipus Rex, the painful end is masked by the blindness of Oedipus about the truth that waits him because he hopes everything to be the opposite. He chooses to be blind about his identity in the beginning of the play and believes in his infallibility until the truth comes to confront him with all its horror. Man wants to be the ruler of the game of life, even though he realizes that there are other forces that he can not control. In order to handle this fact, he either dreams, or blindly refuses to recognize the truth. If he has to die in a crematorium he walks there by himself. Is this not, once again, the stubborn desire of man to be powerful enough to shape his own life, or death? Are the dreams not a form of blindness about the truths that are painful? Is not wisdom an awakening to and dealing with such truths? How do pity and fear transform into wisdom? “By violating our innermost selves, searching for the things which can hurt us most deeply, but which at the same time give us a total feeling of purifying truth that finally brings peace” (ibid, 42). This violation in Oedipus Rex evokes the idea that people are bound in a responsive relationship to one another. Violation in one area can cause a disturbance in other areas. Can we blame anyone for anything? This is not the goal of theater. However, we should consider taking responsibility, which is hard to admit in a crime. Whether it is incest, a plague, or a holocaust, these events are all sufficient to arouse pity and fear, for others and for ourselves. Wisdom comes with accepting responsibility in such incidents. This is not the responsibility of “guilt.” It is rather being responsible for our own lives, which is something we desire. Responsibility is not a divine punishment, but a way to go beyond blaming “fate.” This can lead us to a shared wisdom, and to an acceptance of the truth about mankind and his fallibility. This wisdom is an access to the satisfaction of our “desire to know” more than anything, although it comes with suffering. That is why we experience catharsis, because we are participants, or at least observers, not outsiders to the events that happen to mankind, in the past or in the present. Their suffering fills the air that we also inhale.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Catharsis is a pleasurable (and painful) transformation of pity and fear into wisdom.
Man is a part of the changes in life, because man is in action. He is responsible for his actions. To have the power to shape our own lives is our ultimate desire. However, it is not easy to handle such power, as with power comes responsibility. Recognition of such responsibility arouses pity and fear in us. Theater gives us a safe haven where we can experience the pleasure of dealing with such a truth.
We have a desire to know more. The more we know the more unknowns we face. Theater temporarily satisfies this desire to know in us. The artist works with the raw material in nature. He imitates such material in a way that allows us to explore and experience the deeper truths that lie within ourselves. We, as both observers and participants of the incidents represented on stage, share the vision of the artist, through such experiences.
The goal of theater is to inspire us to have such a vision. It does this with purification, purgation and clarification. After experiencing an arousal of emotions, we feel awakened. Our painful and confusing emotions are transformed into wisdom through the experience of catharsis in theater.
In the modern world, we have too many rules that regulate our lives. It is hard to achieve such transformation under those constraints. However, by touching the most sacred, original and hidden truths, theater can still create such powerful confrontation, and awaken us. Today, catharsis is an essential experience that should be underscored, especially in an era where the effectiveness of theater is in danger of fading away gradually.
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